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Popular opposition to globalization may be interpreted as xenophobia or hostility to market 
economics and signal country risk, including the degree of security risk—the possibility that local 
staff or facilities could be subject to discriminatory treatment, harassment, or attack.  
  This paper integrates the Pew Global Attitudes data into a series of economic models on foreign 
direct investment (FDI), sovereign ratings, and local entrepreneurship and finds that some 
responses correlate with economic variables of interest, conveying information beyond what can 
be explained through standard models. More tolerant countries attract more FDI, obtain better 
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Globalization is typically defined as an expansion of cross-border economic interaction, though 
the term also embodies less precise though important, noneconomic connotations relating to the 
erosion of local control, autonomy, and identity in the organization of political, social, and 
cultural life. At the popular level, these meanings are sometimes conflated with anticapitalist, 
anti-Western, or anti-American impulses. 
Popular attitudes toward globalization, in both its narrow and broad meanings, potentially 
matter for economic outcomes for two reasons. First, public opinion exerts at least some 
constraint on local officials in democratic and nondemocratic polities alike. As a consequence, 
popular attitudes toward globalization may signal local policy tendencies and, perhaps more 
important, the likely character of policy implementation by local authorities. In this way, public 
opinion acts as a signal of country or political risk. These risks include direct expropriation as 
well as indirect expropriation through the ex post imposition of policies such as new labor 
regulations, corporate taxes, or restrictions on the repatriation of capital. This signaling channel 
may be particularly important to foreign firms contemplating direct investment in a particular 
locale. 
More directly, popular attitudes may signal the degree of security risk—the possibility 
that local staff or facilities could be subject to harassment or attack. Such actions range from 
largely symbolic assaults on well-known foreign archetypes such as vandalism of McDonald’s 
hamburger outlets, to more deadly terrorist attacks by militants targeting foreign businesses, to 
more broadly participatory mob assaults on foreign-owned businesses, to less publicized 
kidnappings and assassinations of expatriates that occur on a disturbingly regular basis around the 
world.
1 
The question naturally arises as to how prospective investors form their subjective 
appraisals of potential risks across alternative host locations. One can imagine investors obtaining 
information through a variety of sources including surveys, consultants, and professional risk 
assessment services. In 2002 the Pew Global Attitudes project surveyed more than 38,000 
                                                 
1 McDonald’s (and other well-known, foreign-branded retail outlets such as KFC and Shell) have been 
attacked in Europe, Latin America, and South Asia. Examples of terrorist attacks against a foreign 
enterprise would be the May 2004 assaults by militants on foreign business offices and residences in the 
towns of Yanbu and Khobar, Saudi Arabia, that left 28 people dead. An example of xenophobic communal 
violence would be the January 29, 2003, rioting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. According to a US State 
Department report, rioters methodically attacked Thai-owned businesses, causing an estimated $50 million 
in damages. Reportedly hundreds of foreign executives are kidnapped annually, with the bulk of these 






respondents in 44 countries on their attitudes toward globalization.
2 The responses revealed a 
considerable degree of cross-country variation in attitudes toward globalization in both its 
economic and noneconomic dimensions. Broadly speaking, the publics of East Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa exhibit the most “pro-globalization” attitudes, while those in the Middle East and 
South Asia harbor the greatest reservations. Assuming that these responses are a fair proxy for the 
subjective assessments formed by investors, the issue is whether popular attitudes, as elicited in 
this survey, convey any information about risk or economic outcomes beyond what can be 
explained through standard economic models. 
This paper integrates the Pew data into a series of economic models of foreign direct 
investment, where the investor is foreign and has a physical presence; sovereign bond ratings and 
spreads, where the investor is foreign but has no physical presence, though local public opinion 
may constrain official policy; and local entrepreneurs, who have a physical presence but are 
indigenous. The results indicate that the cross-national responses to a number of Pew survey 
questions correlate with economic variables of interest and appear to convey information about 
risk, and by extension, outcomes. That said, these results should not be oversold: Most of the Pew 
survey responses are insignificant once economic fundamentals are taken into account, and the 
same questions are not statistically significant in each application. Nevertheless, the general 
pattern— stronger correlation between the Pew survey responses and FDI that involves the 
physical presence of a foreign entity as distinct from purely financial transactions or the presence 
of indigenous entrepreneurs—suggests that the pattern of cross-national responses may contain 
information about subjective assessments of security risk.  
 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
Direct investment is the fastest growing segment of cross-border capital flows. Although the 
theoretical impact of foreign investment on economic performance is ambiguous, most research 
suggests that it has a positive impact on growth, at least conditional on education, financial 
                                                 
2 The complete set of questions, country sample sizes, fieldwork dates, modes of collection, and other 
details are provided in the annexes to The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2003). The country sample, by 
region, is North America (United States, Canada), Western Europe (Italy, Great Britain, Germany, France), 
Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Poland, Russia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria), Latin America 
(Mexico, Brazil, Honduras, Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, Argentina), East Asia (Vietnam, 
Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, China), South and West Asia (India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkey, Bangladesh), Africa (Nigeria, Mali, Angola, Senegal, Ghana, Uganda, South Africa, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Ivory Coast), and the Middle East (Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan). In addition, respondents in 






market development, and trade policy openness.
3 As suggested in the introduction, foreign direct 
investors may be particularly sensitive to antiglobalization sentiment inasmuch as they are subject 
to both political risk at the policy level and, to a much greater extent than portfolio investors, 
direct security risk to themselves, their employees, and their facilities.
4 Eight of the questions 
posed in the Pew survey are statistically correlated at the 10 percent level or better with the share 
of FDI inflows in GDP. These statements were phrased in agreement/disagreement form, and 
respondents were asked to indicate whether they strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, somewhat 
disagreed, strongly disagreed, did not know, or had no response. The list of statements or 
questions were as follows: 
(1)  The closing of large inefficient factories (enterprises) is a hardship, but is necessary 
for economic improvement.
5  
(2)  Our way of life needs to be protected from foreign influence.  
(3)  International organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, and World Trade 
Organization have a very good, somewhat good, neutral, somewhat bad, very bad 
influence on the way things are going in our country. 
(4)       What do you think of growing business ties between [survey country] and other 
countries—do you think that it is a very good thing, somewhat good, neutral, 
somewhat bad, or a very bad for our country? 
(5)       Large companies from other countries have a very good, somewhat good, neutral, 
somewhat bad, or a very bad influence on the way things are going in our country.  
                                                 
3 A plausible theoretical example of welfare-reducing capital inflows is FDI induced into a protected 
capital-intensive import-competing sector that can be immiserizing (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983). 
Recent empirical work suggests that FDI inflows are growth-promoting conditional on outward orientation 
(Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford 1996), education (Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee 1999), and 
financial sector development (Alfaro et al. 2003). 
4 In contrast, Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) argue that foreign direct investors may actually be less subject to 
expropriation than portfolio investors since the foreign direct investment often is associated with an 
intangible asset that is difficult to expropriate.  
5 This question was not asked of respondents in North America and Western Europe, and in China the 
statement was phrased as which was closest to their opinion: less inefficient large enterprises is helpful to 
economic improvement, or less inefficient large enterprises is not helpful to economic development. (This 
version of the question is sufficiently unlike the others that the responses were not included in the 
subsequent analysis.)  Question 8 on attitude toward homosexuality was not permitted in China, Egypt, and 
Tanzania. The response to question 2 on foreign influence is not available for Vietnam. For Morocco and 
Kuwait, response data is only available for the globalization question, and it is phrased differently, “All in 







(6)  Do you think that globalization is a very good, somewhat good, neutral,     somewhat 
bad, or very bad thing?  
(7)  Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are 
rich and some are poor. 
(8)  Homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society, or homosexuality 
is a way of life that should not be accepted by society.
6  
As one might expect, inward FDI flows were positively correlated with support for factory 
closings, a market economy, multinational corporations, international economic organizations, 
globalization, growing cross-border business ties, and societal acceptance of homosexuality. 
Inward direct investment was negatively correlated with support for protection from foreign 
influence.
7  
Simple regional averages of the responses for these questions are reported in figures 1 
through 8. Two things stand out. First, there is considerable variation in regional attitudes on 
these issues. Second, among the primarily non-OECD regions (i.e., everything except North 
America and Western Europe), the populations of East Asia and Africa tend to be the most 
enthusiastic about globalization (with the notable exception of attitudes toward homosexuality on 
which Africa’s are the least tolerant of any region), while those of the Middle East and South and 
West Asia tend to be the most skeptical of globalization. The Latin American and Eastern 
European responses tend to fall in the middle.    
Table 1 reports a set of OLS regressions based on these responses. For some countries the 
volume of inward FDI flows is relatively small and can exhibit significant variability due to 
particular individual investments, thus the regressions are estimated on both the contemporaneous 
inflows in 2002 and the average over the previous five years. Columns 1.1 and 1.2 report 
regressions of the Pew responses on the log FDI inflow as a share of GDP in 2002 and 1997–
2002 respectively. Together the Pew variables explain roughly half of sample variation. The 
coefficient on tolerance of homosexuality is statistically significant in both regressions; the 
coefficient on protecting against foreign influence is significant in the regression on the five-year 
                                                 
6 One might question how accurately the Pew survey captured public attitudes. The wording of the 
questions on foreign multinational corporations and another question relating to trust in the United Nations 
are similar to questions posed by two GlobeScan surveys (GlobeScan 2003 and 2004). The cross-country 
correlations between the Pew and GlobeScan responses are quite strong.  
7 Both positive and negative responses to questions are generally correlated with the economic measure 
under consideration. In the interests of parsimony only the more highly correlated response is reported. 
These correlations hold both with respect to contemporaneous FDI inflows in 2002 as well as the average 






average. When log per capita income is added to the regressors in columns 1.3 and 1.6, the 
statistical significance on the coefficients relating to homosexuality and foreign influence 
increases. In addition, in regression 1.3, on 2002 FDI flows, the coefficients on the responses 
relating to closing factories and supporting international organizations are now statistically 
significant. In regressions 1.5 and 1.7 statistically insignificant variables are dropped from the 
regressions, leaving specifications that explain nearly half of sample variance as a function of per 
capita income and the Pew responses on homosexuality, protecting against foreign influence, and 
closing inefficient factories. 
These results are suggestive, but what is really necessary is to demonstrate that they have 
some explanatory power beyond that of conventional economic models. To explore this 
possibility, a conventional economic model of FDI was estimated to establish a baseline cross-
country norm for inward FDI flows. This is a challenge because foreign direct investment may be 
undertaken for a wide variety of motives. One can think of direct investment occurring both 
“horizontally” across countries, as multinational firms reproduce similar activities across 
countries with similar incomes and endowments, and “vertically” across countries of differing 
incomes and endowments, as these firms disaggregate the production process and geographically 
site activities to minimize costs.
8 Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) produce an elegant 
synthesis of these approaches, but their model is highly stylized, and its implications are rejected 
by the data (Blonigen and Wang 2004). What one is left with is an empirical literature that for the 
most part attempts to explain the bilateral volume of FDI flows using gravity-type models 
augmented by specific considerations, such as the role of trade barriers (e.g., Park and Lippoldt 
2003), taxes (e.g., Park and Lippoldt 2003, Grubert and Mutti 2000, Mutti and Grubert 2004), 
corruption (e.g., Wei 2000), intellectual property rights protection (e.g., Park and Lippoldt 2003), 
financial sector development (Albuquerque, Loayza, and Servén 2003), market potential (e.g., 
Carstensen and Toubal 2004, Cieślik and Ryan 2004), and local population health status (Alsan, 
Bloom, and Canning 2004). 
The sheer multiplicity of models raises deep specification issues; there is no meta-model 
template, and there may well never be one. Since in this application the focus is on the potential 
impact of antiglobalization sentiment on risk assessment and, by extension, economic outcomes, 
the goal is simply to derive a plausible reduced form model of the “fundamentals” into which the 
data on public opinion can be integrated. To this end, models on the FDI share in GDP were 
estimated as a function of various combinations of income per capita, wage rates, an OECD 
                                                 






membership dummy, GDP growth, life expectancy, educational attainment, human capital, 
regional dummies, legal origin and receptiveness dummies, official language dummies, WTO 
membership, the CIF/FOB ratio, the official tariff rate, an index of nontariff trade barriers, the 
corporate tax rate, the effective tax rate, a patent rights index, an index of institutional quality, the 
Transparency International corruption score, a variety of indicators of governance, responses on a 
Pew survey question relating to bribery, fiscal balance as a share of GDP, inflation, external debt 
as shares of exports and income, variability of the real exchange rate, the government share of 
GDP, a dummy for privatization revenues, international trade as a share of GDP, and mineral and 
fuel extraction as a share of GDP. In several cases (e.g. wages, the CIF/FOB ratio, the Pew 
bribery question), the available data severely limited the sample size. Some parsimonious reduced 
form regressions are reported in table 2.
9  
Like the attitudinal models reported in table 1, the “economic” regressions in table 2 
explain 50 to 70 percent of sample variance. The most robust explanators of inward FDI are the 
corporate tax rate and a dummy variable for whether there was a privatization in 2001 (or during 
1996–99 in the case of regressions on the five-year average of FDI).
10 The international trade 
share of GDP is significant in regression 2.3 on 2002 FDI flows but just misses significance at the 
10 percent level in regression 2.4 on the five-year average flow. It is arguable that neither the 
openness nor privatization measures are fully exogenous. The rate of inflation was significant 
with the expected negative sign in the regressions on FDI inflows in 2002 (regressions 2.1 and 
2.3) but not on average inflows over 1997–2002. The estimated coefficients on Transparency 
International and World Bank indices of corruption exhibit the same pattern: They are significant 
with the expected negative sign in the regressions on FDI inflows in 2002 but not the five-year 
average. In sum, taxes matter. Openness and privatizations probably count for something, and 
macroeconomic stability and corruption may matter as well. No major surprises here. 
The next step is to synthesize the two explanations—public attitudes and economic 
fundamentals. Due to multicollinearity and small sample size, simply combining the two sets of 
regressors in tables 1 and 2 yields a relatively uninformative set of insignificant coefficient 
estimates. Table 3 reports specifications that feature the most robust subset of explanators from 
the union of the two variable pools derived from a careful though ad hoc specification search. The 
                                                 
9 The country sample for these regressions consists only of countries that overlap with the Pew sample. 
Regressions estimated for a larger sample (up to 123 countries) were not materially different and are not 
reported. 






robust regressors are per capita income (or OECD membership), two “fundamentals” (taxes and 
openness), and the responses to two of the Pew questions—whether local culture should be 
protected from foreign influence and whether homosexuality should be tolerated. The most 
important explanators are per capita income, corporate taxes, and acceptance of homosexuality—
alone, these three variables explain roughly half of sample variance.
11 
To get a sense of how quantitatively significant the public attitudes variables are, the 
following calculation was performed. The exclusively OECD-member North America and 
Western Europe regions were excluded, and a “best practice” standard was formed by averaging 
the highest score from each of the remaining predominately non-OECD member regions. For the 
“do not protect against foreign influence” question, this “non-OECD best practice” score is 34 
(the simple average of Peru, 38; Ukraine, 34; Angola, 37; China, 31; Uzbekistan, 20; and Jordan, 
40). For the homosexuality question, the best practice standard is 48 (the average of Argentina, 
66; Czech Republic, 83; South Africa, 33; the Philippines, 64; Turkey, 22; and Lebanon, 21. The 
coefficients estimated in regressions 3.1 through 3.4 were then used to calculate the increase in 
FDI that would be associated with an increase in a country’s actual score to the best practice 
score.
12  
The first column of table 4 reports the percentage FDI changes associated with increased 
acceptance of foreign influence on local culture, derived from averaging the coefficients obtained 
from regressions 3.1 and 3.2. The second column of the table does the analogous calculation for 
homosexuality based on regressions 3.3 and 3.4. The suggested increases in FDI are quite large, 
in some cases implying a doubling or more. These two columns are not properly additive, 
however. An estimate of the joint effect of increasing tolerance for foreign influences is reported 
in the third column of table 4, derived from the coefficients in regressions 3.5 and 3.6.  Again, the 
implied increases in FDI are quite large, especially in South and West Asia, Africa, and the 
Middle East. 
                                                 
11 This analysis applies to all FDI. Regressions were also estimated on US FDI in manufacturing, derived 
from the 1999 benchmark survey of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. (The US data were used because the 
manufacturing-only data are not available from all global sources.) Compared with the results presented in 
tables 1 and 2, the bilateral manufacturing-only data are less correlated with both fundamentals and 
attitudes variables. Perhaps this is not surprising—much of manufacturing FDI is done through local 
subcontractors and may be much less visibly “foreign” than in mining or services, where facilities may be 
in prominent public display and branding is an important part of local marketing.   
12 If a country is already scoring higher than the best practice standard, no change is assumed. Japan falls 






To be clear, these are simply statistical correlations and the precise channels of causality 
are not well defined. That said, these results echo the finding that the homosexual population 
share was the single best predictor of high-technology industry activity across US metropolitan 
areas (Florida 2002). In turn, the highest demographic correlate with the gay population share was 
the foreign-born share, which could be interpreted as an indicator of acceptance of foreign 
cultural influences. Richard Florida interpreted openness to homosexuals and immigrants as good 
indicators of low entry barriers to human capital, important to spurring creativity and prosperity.
13 
These results are also reminiscent of the arguments made in Glaeser (2004) and Glaeser and Saiz 
(2004) about the role of tolerance, acceptance of foreign immigrants, and human capital 
formation in explaining the varied experiences of US cities in surmounting negative shocks. 
Presumably, one aspect of this tolerance is relative freedom from discrimination, fear of 
harassment, or attack. 
 
SOVEREIGN DEBT RATINGS AND SPREADS  
Sovereign debt ratings are another measure of risk, in this case the risk of default on a financial 
obligation.
14 Although political risk plays a role in ratings, security risk should not play a 
significant role since the investor has no physical presence. To the extent that popular attitudes 
signal political and security risk, one would expect some correlation between the survey results 
and sovereign debt ratings, though perhaps less correlation than with FDI, both in light of the 
absence of the security risk concern and the possibility that sovereign borrowers may successfully 
project a less xenophobic image than would be warranted on the basis of popular attitudes.  
The sovereign debt rating business is dominated by three firms worldwide: Standard and 
Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch-IBCA. The firms are contracted by national authorities who wish to 
float bond issues internationally. Traditionally, the ratings were set in a fairly opaque and 
subjective manner by the ratings agencies’ ratings committees, which bring together analysts with 
comparative expertise in different groups of countries in an attempt to assign consistent ordinal 
                                                 
13 This interpretation has been disputed. Black et al. (2002) find that across American cities “adult-related 
amenities” proxied by housing costs more strongly affect the location decisions of homosexual couples 
than local attitudes toward homosexuality. But this does not clearly establish the direction or pattern of 
causality with respect to economic prosperity: Cross-jurisdictional housing costs are presumably a function 
of expected future rental streams, themselves a function of expected future economic activity. In any event, 
it is not clear that this dispute is germane to the case at hand, where attitudes can be measured directly, and 
macroeconomically significant cross-border population movement in response to varying attitudes toward 
homosexuality is implausible. 
14 Moody’s (2001), Bhatia (2002), and Reisen (2003) provide useful overviews of the ratings industry and 






rankings across their clients. Historically, rating was concentrated on foreign currency debt, but 
there has been rising demand for local currency ratings, and today the ratings agencies rate nearly 
as many countries for local currency debt as for foreign currency debt.  
Sovereign debt ratings are of direct importance for the impact they have on sovereign 
borrowing terms and of indirect importance through the impact on the borrowing costs of 
subnational government entities, banks, and nonfinancial corporates, inasmuch as historically 
ratings for these nonsovereign borrowers did not “pierce the ceiling” of the sovereign rating. 
Although departures from this practice have increased, it is still a relatively rare phenomenon, and 
some research suggests that in the case of developing countries, sovereign ratings continue to 
exert a strong influence on the ratings assigned to nonsovereign borrowers (Ferri and Liu 2003). 
The ratings also affect the functioning of the banking system through the Basle international bank 
standards use of ratings to assign risk scores to lending to emerging market sovereigns.  
Cantor and Packer (1996) provided the first quantitative analysis of the determinants of 
sovereign ratings, finding that income per capita, GDP growth, inflation, the central government 
fiscal balance relative to GDP, the current account balance relative to GDP, external debt relative 
to exports, a dummy variable for “industrialized country,” and a dummy for a history of prior 
default explained roughly 90 percent of sample variation. Monfort and Mulder (2000) in an 
ensuing paper identified a somewhat different set of robust explanators for sovereign ratings: 
external debts relative to exports, a history of rescheduling, the terms of trade, the growth rate of 
exports, the general government balance relative to GDP, the growth rate of output, the share of 
investment in GDP, and inflation.  
These traditional macroeconomic indicators used by the ratings agencies did not do a 
particularly good job of predicting the Asian financial crisis, which had important roots in the 
functioning of local financial systems. The ratings agencies scrambled to revise their ratings in 
the face of a crisis that emerged for reasons significantly unrelated to traditional macro 
imbalances, and in its aftermath announced broader, more systematic criteria for assigning 
ratings. In the case of Moody’s, the list of indicators was expanded to include indicators such as 
the external liabilities of local bank systems relative to their external assets, while S&P actually 
tried to devise estimates of contingent liabilities.
15 For the purposes of statistical analysis, the 
Moody’s foreign currency sovereign debt ratings for April 30, 2004, were assigned ordinal values 
ranging from 18 (for Aaa) to 0 (for Caa3). Responses to four of the eight previously identified 
Pew questions were significantly correlated with the ratings, with the expected signs at the 10 
                                                 






percent level or better: support for closing inefficient factories, opposing protecting against 
foreign influence, support for international economic organizations, and acceptance of 
homosexuality. The issue is whether these correlations yield additional information beyond that 
contained in the standard model. 
OLS and ordered logit regressions were estimated on the basis of a specification search 
involving more than 50 potential explanatory variables identified by Cantor and Packer (1996), 
Monfort and Mulder (2000), and Moody’s (2004). Regressions of the sovereign rating as a 
function of dummy variables for “industrial country,” membership in the OECD, and a previous 
history of default, GDP per capita, inflation, the ratio of total external debts to official foreign 
reserves, the dollarization ratio defined as the ratio of total foreign currency deposits to total 
deposits in domestic banks, the investment share of GDP, and the liquidity ratio defined as the 
ratio of liabilities to BIS banks due within one year to total assets held in BIS banks are reported 
in table 5.
16  
Regressions 5.1, 5.3, 5.5, and 5.6 are alternative estimations of “fundamentals” models 
for the maximum sample of 93 countries. The OLS and ordered logit regressions generate similar 
results, though the industrial country and default history dummies, which are significant in the 
OLS regressions, are not significant in the ordered logit regressions. Regressions 5.2, 5.4, and 5.7 
reproduce these specifications for the smaller (n=31) Pew-response constrained sample (the 
ordered logit equivalent regression to 5.2 did not converge). When the same regressions are 
estimated for the smaller sample of countries, the coefficients on the OECD, industrial country, 
and default history dummies, as well as the dollarization ratio and liquidity ratio, become 
insignificant. 
In table 6, responses to the four Pew questions that were significantly correlated with the 
ratings are added one at a time to the baseline fundamentals model, dropping statistically 
insignificant variables. (In principle, any of the other four attitudinal variables that exhibited no 
significant simple correlation with the ratings could turn out to have a controlled (partial) 
correlation in the regressions with the fundamentals. In this exercise we constrain the 
explanations to those that revealed significant direct unconditional correlation to ward against 
spurious results.) Of the included four responses, only the one on homosexuality is statistically 
                                                 
16 The distinction between “industrial countries” versus the OECD is essentially based on the financial 
market concept of ‘emerging markets”—i.e., Hong Kong and Singapore are “industrial countries” that are 
not members of the OECD. Emerging market economies that are members of the OECD but not counted as 
industrial countries by Moody’s are the Czech Republic, Hungary, South Korea, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, 






significant once the fundamentals are taken into account, and only in the OLS estimation, though 
it is nearly significant at the 10 percent level in the ordered logit regression.  
To get a sense of the magnitude of the estimated coefficient, the impact of moving to the 
non-OECD “best practice” standard was computed. In the first column of table 7, the step-change 
in ratings associated with the attainment of the “best practice” standard derived from regression 
6.4 is reported. So, for example, if Jordan achieved the “best practice” standard, statistically 
speaking one would expect a single step upgrade in Jordan’s sovereign debt rating. For a number 
of countries in the sample, a two-step or notch upgrade would be expected. The second column, 
derived from regression 6.8, reports the odds on an upgrade of one or more notches associated 
with attaining the best practice standard.  So, for example, the odds of Jordan receiving at least a 
one-notch upgrade would be 2.5 to 1 if it attained the best practice standard. For some countries 
in the sample, the odds are more than 3 to 1. 
A natural way of thinking about the implicit costs associated with these public attitudes 
would be directly through the impact on sovereign debt spreads. Unfortunately, the paucity of 
available data makes it difficult to investigate this directly. Only 17 countries appear in both the 
Pew sample and the J.P. Morgan EMBI Global Bond Index in April 2004, and Argentina is an 
extreme outlier, completely dominating the correlations. Excluding Argentina leaves at most 16 
countries, and most of the correlations are statistically insignificant. The exceptions are 
opposition to factory closings and antipathy to international economic organizations, which are 
correlated with higher sovereign debt spreads. 
Alternatively, one can look at the impact of the sovereign debt rating itself. In a simple 
regression of the Moody’s rating on the EMBI Global Bond Index spreads, the coefficient on the 
rating is –65 with a t-statistic of more than 7.0 explaining 68 percent of variance, with the caveat 
that there is some evidence that the impact of the decisions is nonlinear in the sense that the 
change in borrowing costs is greater for a shift between the “investment grade” and 
subinvestment grade ranks than for changes in ratings within those categories (Ferri, Liu, and 
Stiglitz 1999). Applying this estimate to the figures in table 7 implies that Jordan, for example, 
would experience a 65 basis point improvement in sovereign borrowing costs by attaining the 
non-OECD “best practice” standard with respect to societal acceptance of homosexuality, or 
whatever social attitudes for which it is a proxy. 
 
DOMESTIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
The evidence presented thus far indicates that public attitudes toward globalization are strongly 






sovereign debt ratings, which are a measure of financial risk. Yet another way to examine the 
issue as to whether the data on public opinion confer information on security risk would be to 
examine the behavior of local investors (which could differ from foreigners). The Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project reports data on “total entrepreneurial activity” (TEA), 
defined as the prevalence rate among individuals aged 18 to 64 active in either the start-up phase 
or in managing a new business. These data were derived from more than 100,000 interviews 
conducted in 31 countries in 2003 (Reynolds et al. 2003).
17  This index is correlated with a 
number of country characteristics (Reynolds et al. 2003, tables 17 and 18). These include 
demographic characteristics (the level of per capita income and the adult population shares of the 
25 to 34 and 55- to 64-year-old cohorts). Macroeconomic correlates include the rate of per capita 
income growth over the previous five years and the level of unemployment. There are also a set 
of correlates that would appear to represent implicit and explicit opportunity costs associated with 
involvement in a new business, including the level of public sector employment (possibly 
representing the availability of low-risk employment), collected tax revenue, employer 
contributions to social security, and total social security costs. Lastly, there is a set of variables 
that could be interpreted as implicit entry barriers to new firms: a measure of the cost of 
registering a new firm and an index of “economic freedom.”  
Many of these variables are highly collinear, with the male (female) older (younger) adult 
population shares being the most obvious example. Three parsimonious regression specifications 
are reported in table 8. Across countries, the TEA prevalence rate is robustly inversely correlated 
with the level of per capita GDP and the growth rate of per capita income over the previous five 
years. It is also highly positively (negatively) correlated with the share of younger (older) male or 
female adults in the population.
18  TEA prevalence was also inversely correlated, though less 
robustly, with the unemployment rate over the previous three years and the costs of registering a 
new business and positively associated with “economic freedom.” The regressions explain a bit 
less than two-thirds of sample variation. 
Table 9 reports regressions of the level of per capita income and the eight Pew survey 
questions on the TEA prevalence rate. Two things are quite noticeable. First, the overlap between 
the GEM and Pew samples is small—18 countries maximum. Second, there appears to be little 
correlation between the Pew survey responses and the TEA index. In table 9, only the response to 
                                                 
17 Interviews were conducted in 41countries over 2000–03. 
18 Of these four variants, the younger adult female share was often slightly more correlated, and these 






the question on whether globalization is good is statistically significant (regression 9.6). In 
addition to public attitudes with respect to globalization and conditional on the fundamentals, 
however, , support for free markets and support for cross-border business ties are correlated with 
the TEA index when entered into the regressions singly, though not jointly (table 10). To address 
the lack of joint significance of the attitudinal variables, a variable formed from the first principal 
component of each of the three Pew variables was calculated.
19 This principal component variable 
is statistically significant in all specifications.   
Again, to get a sense of the magnitude of the coefficients on the public attitude variables, 
“best practice” standards were calculated for the predominately non-OECD regions. For “free 
market support” the best practice standard was 70 percent (Venezuela, 63 percent; Ukraine, 64 
percent; Nigeria, 80 percent; Vietnam, 95 percent; and Pakistan, 50 percent); for “globalization is 
good” it was 77 percent (Venezuela, 77 percent; Czech Republic, 69 percent; Nigeria, 90 percent; 
Korea, 84 percent; and Bangladesh, 63 percent); and for “growing business ties are good” it was 
93 percent (Honduras, 93 percent; Ukraine, 93 percent; Senegal, 98 percent; Vietnam, 98 percent; 
and Bangladesh, 84 percent).
20 Table 11 displays the implied increases in TEA prevalence for 
countries in predominately non-OECD regions associated with attaining the non-OECD best 
practices standard.  
The implied changes vary enormously. The largest projected effects are in Argentina, 
where the combined effect of achieving the best practice standard implies more than 10 percent of 
the labor force becoming involved with start-ups or new firms. It is possible that the relatively 
negative Argentine attitudes toward market economics and cross-border integration were 
accentuated by the Argentine crisis, ongoing when the Pew survey was undertaken. After 
Argentina, the next largest effects are in India and Poland. One would be tempted to ascribe this 
result to a combination of a socialist economic tradition and possibly risk aversion associated 
with weak protection of property rights, except that China—which shares the socialist tradition, 
lack of transparency in governance, and until recently had no constitutionally enshrined property 
rights—at the other end of the spectrum exhibits no positive projected response. The other 
countries exhibiting no positive response are Korea, Uganda, and South Africa. It is hard to come 
up with a simple explanation of what the Pew responses are picking up that could explain this odd 
pattern of extreme observations, other than reflecting some basic promarket attitudes among the 
                                                 
19 The weights in this variable are free markets (35 percent), globalization (33 percent), and cross-border 
business ties (32 percent).  






populations of East Asia and Africa, though even this broad generalization is inadequate given 




Globalization is typically defined as an expansion of cross-border economic interaction, though 
the term also embodies less precise though important noneconomic meanings, and opposition to 
globalization may be interpreted, perhaps mistakenly, as xenophobia or hostility to market 
economics. In this regard, popular attitudes toward globalization may act as a signal of country 
risk, specifically the degree of security risk—the possibility that local staff or facilities could be 
subject to harassment or attack.  
This paper has integrated the Pew Global Attitudes data into a series of economic models 
on foreign direct investment, sovereign debt ratings, and entrepreneurship, and it finds that 
responses to the Pew questions robustly correlate with economic variables of interest and convey 
information about outcomes beyond what can be explained through standard economic models. 
Crudely put, the results indicate countries with better attitudes toward globalization attract more 
FDI, obtain better debt ratings, and exhibit more local entrepreneurship. That said, the results are 
not particularly robust—in each application most of the coefficients on the Pew responses are 
statistically insignificant, and the causal linkage between the attitudes revealed in the survey data 
and the economic outcomes is speculative. Nevertheless, at least one of the coefficients on at least 
one of the Pew survey variables is always significant, and the magnitudes of the estimated 
coefficients are large in the sense that plausible changes in Pew sample values imply 
economically meaningful changes in FDI, debt ratings, and entrepreneurship. These data appear 
to contain some new and important information, however inchoate. 
These results suggest that there could be real economic payoffs to transforming public 
perceptions toward globalization. The problem, of course, from the standpoint of public policy, is 
that it is not obvious how one encourages the public to take a more positive view of change, 
especially change emanating from foreign or nontraditional sources. Presumably the starting point 
would be political commitment to constructive engagement with the outside world coupled with 
public campaigns to overcome xenophobia or intolerance. 
                                                 
21 Table 11 reports changes in the TEA index itself. If these responses are converted to percentage changes, 
one obtains an even wider dispersion due to the correlation between low observed TEA values with 
relatively antiglobalization attitudes. So for example, the combined-effect percentage increase is more than 
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ln FDI inflows 
share GDP 02
ln FDI inflows 
share GDP AVG 
1997-02
ln FDI inflows 
share GDP 02
ln FDI inflows 
share GDP 02
ln FDI inflows 
share GDP 02
ln FDI inflows 
share GDP AVG 
1997-02
ln FDI inflows 
share GDP AVG 
1997-02
Observations 33 33 33 33 34 33 40
R-squared 0.44 0.60 0.59 0.52 0.47 0.66 0.49
Constant -3.749 -1.395 0.057 2.149 1.300 0.449 3.139
(1.85)
c (1.04) (0.03) (1.29) (0.99) (0.28) (4.31)
a



























International orgs., good -0.011 -0.005 -0.035 -0.010 -0.018
(0.59) (0.42) (1.85)
c (0.89) (1.31)
Growing business ties, good 0.025 0.001 0.033 0.005
(0.90) (0.08) (1.35) (0.30)
Multinational corps., good 0.023 0.024 0.019 0.023
(0.91) (1.47) (0.88) (1.49)
Support free markets -0.002 -0.004 0.013 0.005
(0.13) (0.36) (0.85) (0.40)
Globalization good -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008
(0.78) (1.08) (0.74) (0.98)
a. Significant at 1 percent level.
b. Significant at 5 percent level.
c. Significant at 10 percent level.
* 2001 value for regressions 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5; 1996 value for regressions 1.2, 1.6, and 1.7.
Table 1(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)
ln FDI inflows share 
GDP 02
ln FDI inflows share 
GDP AVG 97-02
ln FDI Inflows Share 
GDP 02
ln FDI inflows share 
GDP AVG 97-02
Observations 35 39 33 24
R-squared 0.67 0.53 0.70 0.52















Control of corruption* -0.81 -0.07
(3.55)
a (0.25)
ln transparency int'l* -1.57 0.36
(4.46)
a (0.90)




ln openness* 0.59 0.68
(2.41)
b (1.74)






a. Significant at 1percent level.
b. Significant at 5 percent level.
c. Significant at 10 percent level.
*  2001 value for regs. 2.1 and 2.3; 1996 value for regs. 2.2 and 2.4.
** Indicates positive privatization revenues during 1996-99 in Regs. 2.1 and 2.3; during 1993-6 in Regs. 2.2 and 2.4.
Table 2(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6)
ln FDI Inflows 
Share GDP 02
ln FDI Inflows 
Share GDP AVG 
9702
ln FDI Inflows 
Share GDP 02
ln FDI Inflows 
Share GDP AVG 
9702
ln FDI Inflows 
Share GDP 02
ln FDI Inflows 
Share GDP AVG 
9702
Observations 36 37 33 35 33 34
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.57








































a. Significant at 1 percent level.
b. Significant at 5 percent level
c. Significant at 10 percent level.
* 2001 value in regs. 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5; 1996 values in regs. 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6.
Table 3
Do not protect against foreign 
influenceForeign Influence Homosexuality Combined*
Middle East/North Africa
Egypt 89 question not permitted n/a
Jordan 0 101 94
Lebanon 54 76 89
Latin America
Argentina 11 0 4
Bolivia 62 0 22
Brazil 34 0 12
Guatemala 50 12 28
Honduras 62 20 40
Mexico 50 0 18
Peru 0 9 8
Venezuela 11 6 10
Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 42 31 44
Czech Republic 7 0 3
Poland 15 23 26
Russia 58 73 88
Slovak Republic 3 0 1
Ukraine 0 87 81
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola 0 51 47
Cote d'Ivoire 50 93 104
Ghana 85 124 144
Kenya 77 132 149
Mali 85 127 147
Nigeria 58 124 135
Senegal 81 129 148
South Africa 73 42 65
Tanzania 73 question not permitted n/a
Uganda 85 124 144
East Asia/Pacific
China 11 question not permitted n/a
Indonesia 85 121 142
Korea, Rep. 69 65 85
Philippines 66 0 23
Vietnam n/a 99 n/a
South and West Asia
Bangladesh 101 115 142
India 116 115 148
Pakistan 108 110 140
Turkey 105 73 105
Uzbekistan 54 107 118
Source: Author's calculations, Pew Global Attitudes Project (2003), UNCTAD (2003).
* Represents percent increase in FDI implied by adopting global best practices in both responses.
Table 4
Increase in FDI implied by adopting global best practices (percent)(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5*) (5.6*) (5.7*)
moodysapril04 moodysapril04 moodysapril04 moodysapril04 moodysapril04 moodysapril04 moodysapril04
Observations 93 31 93 31 93 93 31
R-squared 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.91






Industrial country dummy 2.18468 -0.73377 2.25793
(2.34)
b (0.20) (1.56)




Default history -1.03757 -0.08183 -0.55465 1.28461
(1.75)
c (0.05) (0.89) (0.78)















































a. Significant at 1percent level.
b. Significant at 5percent level
c. Significant at 10 percent level.
* Ordered logit regression.
Table 5(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5*) (6.6*) (6.7*) (6.8*)
moodysapril04 moodysapril04 moodysapril04 moodysapril04 moodysapril04 moodysapril04 moodysapril04 moodysapril04
Observations 25 31 31 31 25 31 31 31
R-squared 0.66 0.90 0.90 0.90















































Close factories 0.00707 0.01491
(0.17) (0.43)
Do not protect against foreign influence 0.00776 -0.01690
(0.21) (0.46)
International orgs., good 0.02825 0.03103
(1.24) (1.33)
Accept homosexuality 0.03974 0.02493
(1.99)
c (1.12)
a. Significant at 1 percfent level.
b. Significant at 5 percent level.
c. Significant at 10 perecent level.
* Ordered logit regression.
Table 6Spec. 4 (notches) Spec. 4 (odds)*
Middle East/North Africa
Egypt question not permitted question not permitted
Jordan 1 2.5 : 1
Lebanon 1 2.0 : 1
Latin America
Argentina 0 1.0 : 1
Bolivia 0 1.0 : 1
Brazil 0 1.0 : 1
Guatemala 0 1.1 : 1
Honduras 0 1.2 : 1
Mexico 0 1.0 : 1
Peru 0 1.1 : 1
Venezuela 0 1.1 : 1
Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 0 1.3 : 1
Czech Republic 0 1.0 : 1
Poland 0 1.2 : 1
Russia 1 1.9 : 1
Slovak Republic 0 1.0 : 1
Ukraine 1 2.2 : 1
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola 1 1.6 : 1
Cote d'Ivoire 1 2.3 : 1
Ghana 2 3.0 : 1
Kenya 2 3.2 : 1
Mali 2 3.1 : 1
Nigeria 2 3.0 : 1
Senegal 2 3.2 : 1
South Africa 1 1.5 : 1
Tanzania question not permitted question not permitted
Uganda 2 3.0 : 1
East Asia/Pacific
China question not permitted question not permitted
Indonesia 2 2.9 : 1
Korea, Rep. 1 1.8 : 1
Philippines 0 1.0 : 1
Vietnam 1 2.4 : 1
South and West Asia
Bangladesh 2 2.8 : 1
India 2 2.8 : 1
Pakistan 2 2.7 : 1
Turkey 1 1.9 : 1
Uzbekistan 2 2.6 : 1
Source: Author's calculations, Pew Global Attitudes Project (2003), Moody's (2004).
* Reported ratio represents the odds of having a higher sovereign credit rating.
Table 7
Increase in Moodys Rating implied by adopting global best practices in 
homosexuality response(8.1) (8.2) (8.3)
tea2003 tea2003 tea2003
Observations 40 40 38
R-squared 0.63 0.65 0.64
Constant 23.24 27.09 24.29
(1.17) (1.41) (1.33)















Index of economic freedom 2.97
(1.83)
c
Unemployment 1999-2001 -0.36 -0.23
(2.46)
b (1.62)
New firm costs as a share of GNP per capita -8.50
(2.41)
b
a. Significant at 1 percent  level.
b. Significant at 5 percent level.
c. Significant at 10 percent level.
Table 8(9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) (9.7) (9.8)
tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003
Observations 10 18 18 18 18 18 18 17
R-squared 0.21 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.52 0.39 0.41


















Do not close factories 0.00
(0.01)
Support free markets 0.10
(0.98)
Multinational corps., good 0.10
(0.93)
International orgs., good 0.05
(0.39)









a. Significant at 1 percent level.
b. Significant at 5 percent level
c. Significant at 10 percent level.
Table 9(10.1) (10.2) (10.3) (10.4) (10.5) (10.6) (10.7) (10.8) (10.9) (10.10) (10.11) (10.12)
tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003 tea2003
Observations 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 17 17
R-squared 0.74 0.77 0.70 0.75 0.86 0.84 0.80 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.79 0.83
Constant 52.87 57.30 15.35 60.59 88.00 77.72 35.66 94.26 65.59 48.42 19.44 70.09
(1.32) (1.51) (0.37) (1.50) (2.87)
b (2.38)
b (1.05) (2.97)
b (1.72) (1.27) (0.59) (1.74)


























Share of young women 0.29 0.13 0.74 0.33 -0.18 -0.13 0.39 -0.08 0.30 0.43 0.90 0.37
(0.45) (0.21) (1.17) (0.53) (0.37) (0.24) (0.74) (0.18) (0.48) (0.65) (1.64) (0.62)
Index of economic freedom 2.01 2.29 3.64 2.63
(0.67) (0.82) (1.15) (0.91)










-8.68 -9.00 -13.05 -8.72
(1.34) (1.24) (2.02)
c (1.33)









Growing business ties, good 0.23 0.33 0.23
(1.39) (2.43)
b (1.45)





* Represents the first principal component of the free markets, globalization, and growing business ties survey responses.
a. Significant at 1 percent level.
b. Significant at 5 percent level.
c. Significant at 10 significant level.
a
Table 10
New firm costs as a share of 
GNP per capitaPEWFreeMarket PEWGlobalization PEWGrowingBusiness Combined 
Support Good TiesGood Best Practices*
Latin America
Argentina 9.9 7.8 8.8 10.1
Brazil 3.2 2.0 5.3 3.6
Mexico 5.7 5.9 3.7 5.4
Venezuela 1.7 0.0 1.9 0.6
Eastern Europe
Poland 5.9 7.2 4.0 6.1
Russia 5.7 8.5 1.4 5.3
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Africa 0.0 1.2 1.4 0.0
Uganda 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0
East Asia/Pacific
China 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.0
Japan 6.1 4.4 5.6 5.8
Korea, Rep. 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
South Asia
India 5.9 5.9 6.4 6.7
* Represents points increase in TEA Index implied by adopting global best practices in all three responses
Source: Author's calculations, Pew Global Attitudes Project (2003), Reynolds et al. (2004).
Table 11
Increase in TEA Index implied by adopting global best practices